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POLICY CHALLENGE
Funding all possible low-carbon technologies with all types of support
instruments is not a sensible or viable option. Finite budgets need to be
allocated to different technologies, but not all innovation policies are
equally efficient. However, the combination of the three support policies
and their coordination at European level can improve results and reduce
costs. To make low-carbon technology support smarter the European Union
should (1) improve carbon pricing, especially provide more long-term visibil-
ity for the carbon price; (2) enhance European cooperation, both in terms of
deployment and R&D support; (3)
balance support for deployment
and RD&D; and (4) develop a more
methodological approach to
technology selection.
This Policy Brief summarises previous
papers that have benefited from
funding under the Simpatic project
(http://www.simpatic.eu). Research
assistance by Burak Turkoglu and
Augustin Lagarde is acknowledged.
Low-carbon patents increase: number of
applications to the European Patent Office
THE ISSUE Combating climate change on the global level will be much easier
when abundant low-carbon technologies that are competitive in their cost and
capabilities are available. But private companies underinvest in low-carbon
innovation because they cannot capture the climate benefits. There are three
policies to address this issue: pricing carbon, supporting deployment of as-yet
uncompetitive technologies and supporting research and development.
Source: Bruegel.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
Wind energy
Photovoltaic energy
br
ue
ge
lp
ol
ic
yb
ri
ef
02
MAKING LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT SMARTER
1. A concentration of
450 ppm is “likely to
maintain warming
below 2°C over the 21st
century relative to pre-
industrial levels” (see
IPCC, 2014). The 2°C
threshold has been
adopted and reiterated
by policymakers in
various forums.
2. Lower demand for
fossil fuels in some
countries might
translate into lower
global fossil-fuel prices,
making it even more
attractive for other
countries to use fossil-
fuel resources.
3. Steinmueller (2011)
identifies four main
themes: policies
affecting supply of
technology,
complementary factors,
policies affecting
demand and changes
in institutional design.
4. For example,
according to
Steinmueller (2011):
there is a “need to
improve the theoretical
frameworks for
[innovation] policy
formulation.”
5. The EU and the
Orgainsation for
Economic Cooperation
and Development run,
for example, monitoring
and evaluation of
national innovation
policies.
WHILE THE SPECIFIC EFFECTS of
increasing concentrations of
greenhouse-gases in the atmos-
phere on the climate system
cannot be accurately predicted,
there is a non-trivial risk that
beyond some ex-ante unknown
tipping points – in terms of green-
house-gas concentration and/or
global temperature – irreversible
and highly expensive events
might unfold. This calls for quick
action to reduce the probability
that such tipping points will be
passed. Annual greenhouse gas
emissions will have to be reduced
dramatically before 2050. In
order to stabilise carbon dioxide
concentrations in the atmosphere
at about 450 parts per million
(ppm)1 by 2050, global emissions
would have to decline by about
40-70 percent by 2050.
Such aggressive global decarbon-
isation requires an international
agreement. Otherwise, fossil fuels
not used in some countries will be
used in others2. But an agreement
is only feasible and stable if the
benefit for each country exceeds
the cost, which depends on the
cost of low-carbon technologies.
Consequently, reducing the cost
of these technologies in Europe
would not only allow cheaper
domestic decarbonisation and for
a competitive edge to be gained in
selling these technologies over-
seas, but most importantly it
would be a major contribution to
an international agreement.
In this Policy Brief, we describe
the interaction between three
approaches that are effective in
driving innovation in low-carbon
technologies. Based on that, we
provide four recommendations
for making low-carbon technology
support smarter: (1) improve car-
bon pricing; (2) improve
European cooperation; (3) com-
bine deployment and research,
development and demonstration
(RD&D) support; and (4) take a
more methodological approach to
technology selection.
KEY STRATEGIES TO DRIVE LOW-
CARBON INNOVATION
Numerous policy instruments
support innovation, ranging from
patent protection to public
research funding and public pro-
curement, to subsidies for private
investment in innovation3, but
there is no consensus on a single
best practise4. There are, however,
conventional ‘dos and don’ts’. For
example, do regularly conduct
independent evaluations of inno-
vation policies, do avoid
excessive risk aversion in project
selection and do determine clear
triggers for cutting support5.
This is also true for low-carbon
innovation, but supporting low-
carbon innovation involves the
particular challenge of targeting
innovation that brings down the
decarbonisation cost. For this,
there are three main policies: (i) a
price on carbon, (ii) directly sup-
port public and private RD&D
investment in the targeted low-
carbon technologies, and (iii)
create demand for technologies
to foster private innovation.
Pricing carbon
If companies know that they or
their (potential) customers will be
faced with high carbon prices in
the future, they will have every
incentive to invest in develop-
ment of low-carbon alternatives.
Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2012)
provide evidence that carbon pric-
ing in the EU has increased
low-carbon patenting both by
companies directly covered by
the EU emissions trading system
(ETS) and by companies that do
not fall under the ETS6 (Figure 1).
Creating the expectation of a high
future carbon price has one big
advantage over all other innova-
tion policies (such as predictably
tightening fuel standards) – it is
completely technology neutral. At
the same time, carbon pricing
incentivises investment in low-
carbon power technologies (eg
solar photovoltaic), energy-effi-
cient appliances, carbon capture
and storage or more resource-effi-
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Figure 1: Share of low carbon patents by companies falling under
the ETS and companies not falling under the ETS
Source: Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2012). Note: start of the ETS: 2005.
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6. The effect on compa-
nies outside the ETS
might arise because
most of the low-carbon
innovation attributable
to carbon pricing would
be expected to take
place in technology
providers (such as
ABB) that are not
directly covered by the
ETS but that supply
companies that are
(such as RWE).
7. See for example
Dechezleprêtre et al
(2013), who show that
‘green patents’ are cited
more often in other
patents than ‘non-green
patents’, even when
controlling for numer-
ous third factors.
8. This European target
was broken down to
national targets (eg 18
percent for Germany or
49 percent for Sweden).
9. Too-generous sup-
port in fact appears to
reduce the producers’
incentives to aggres-
sively compete on
innovation. The ten
largest solar panel pro-
ducers all spend below
5 percent – most of
them below 2 percent –
on research and devel-
opment, compared to
10-20 percent in the
semiconductor sector;
see www.pv-
tech.org/friday_focus/fri
day_focus_rd_spending_a
nalysis_of_top_10_pv_mo
dule_manufacturers.
cient processes (eg recycling of
aluminium). Therefore, the policy
challenge for the EU is to create
the ‘right’ price and to make it
durably credible.
But even at a ‘perfect’ EU carbon
price there will still be private
under-investment in low-carbon
innovation, because private
investors will not be able to reap
the climate benefits that the low-
carbon technologies they
produce have outside the EU –
assuming no carbon price exists
there. For example, the sale price
of an innovative wind turbine in
Europe could be as high as that of
the next-cheapest low-carbon
technology, while in Vietnam the
innovator might only be able to
sell it if the price stays below the
cost of a coal plant. Innovators
therefore face below-optimal
incentives to invest in improving
their designs. In addition, as with
all innovation, the innovator might
not be able to fully appropriate all
the benefits, such as spillovers
onto other innovators, and it has
even been argued that these
spillovers are particularly large for
green technologies7. So additional
support schemes are justified.
Supporting deployment of as-
yet uncommercial technologies
The prospect of deployment is the
carrot for industry to commer-
cialise new technologies.
Long-term deployment targets –
such as the EU's 20 percent by
2020 target for renewable
energy8 – are helpful, not least
because they incentivise innova-
tion and investment in
complementary technologies,
such as storage or networks. For
example, the creation of a 40
gigawatt global market for the
deployment of photovoltaic pan-
els between 2000 and 2010
arguably made a major contribu-
tion to the reduction in cost of
solar cells from $5/watt to
$1/watt. Zachmann et al (2014)
found that increased deployment
coincides with more patents in
the corresponding technology
(Figure 2 shows this for Germany).
There is an active discussion on
how deployment can best be sup-
ported. German technology-
specific feed-in tariffs, for exam-
ple, were very effective in
creating a significant market for
onshore wind, solar PV and bio-
gas, but the costs were also sig-
nificant and there was some
concern that guaranteed tariffs
for everyone do not sufficiently
push innovation9. Other countries
went for tendering schemes,
renewables certificates, tax
breaks or renewables-premium
models. For certain sectors (such
as buildings, cars or appliances),
predictably tightening standards
provides the prospect of deploy-
ment of as-yet uncompetitive
technologies.
Deployment policies are often
evaluated by the short-term cost
per deployed unit of low-carbon
technology10. From an innovation
standpoint this is only of second-
ary importance because the aim
is to bring down the cost of future
generations of the supported
technology. From an innovation
standpoint, three main questions
arise: (i) How predictable is future
market size (eg the year-to-year
decision on tax breaks in some US
states is not helpful in deploying
an efficient value chain)? (ii)
Does the set-up remunerate inno-
vative solutions, eg by setting
feed-in tariffs that are likely to be
only sufficient for next-genera-
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Figure 2: Estimated impact on the number of corresponding patents of an increase in deployment of
solar panels and wind turbines in Germany
Source: Zachmann et al (2014). Note: in both panels, blue line: number of patents estimated with no policy change; red line: number of
patents estimated with one standard deviation higher deployment after 2002.
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10. This often relates to
how effectively the poli-
cies shielded investors
from regulatory and
market risks.
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tion technology? (iii) How openly
does the policy deal with different
technologies (eg German feed-in
tariffs support only a narrow set of
‘proven’ technologies)? 
Public RD&D spending and
support for private RD&D
Public research is an important
source of basic innovation. In
addition, the publicly-funded edu-
cation of researchers reduces the
private sector’s cost of innova-
tion. Furthermore, all OECD
countries have specific policies to
support private investment in
RD&D. Zachmann et al (2014)
provides evidence that increased
public RD&D spending coincides
with more patents in the corre-
sponding technology (Figure 3
shows this for Germany).
While some of the mechanisms
work irrespective of the area of
innovation (eg investment in
RD&D is tax-deductible in some
countries), most public funding
for RD&D is explicitly or implicitly
targeted at certain sectors. His-
tory shows that targeted
technologies and sectors do not
necessarily meet initial expecta-
tions. For example, nuclear fis-
sion, nuclear fusion and
hydrogen have received signifi-
cant support but have not yet
achieved the hoped-for commer-
cial break-through. So, betting all
support on a single ‘silver bullet’
is too risky. The increasing diver-
sification of the portfolio of
supported technologies goes in
the right direction (see Figure 4
on the next page). But the EU
lacks a process that aims at opti-
mal allocation.
So a key question is: how should
public spending be targeted at
individual technologies or objec-
tives? This is particularly relevant
when the aim is to develop tech-
nologies that make
decarbonisation cheaper,
because those technologies often
compete with each other. In addi-
tion, not only individual
technologies (such as solar PV
and onshore wind) compete for
future markets, but also entire
energy systems. Decarbonisation
might take very different routes,
such as: (i) low-carbon electricity
production (from either renew-
ables, nuclear or power plants
equipped with carbon capture
and storage) plus electrification
of transport and heat versus
hydrogen as a new carrier and
storage for energy; (ii) centralisa-
tion of energy supply with strong
networks versus decentralised
solutions with local storage; (iii)
massive reduction in energy
demand versus decarbonisation
of energy supply.
Policies working together
Public funding of RD&D, public
support for deployment of low-
carbon technologies and a
forward-looking carbon price can
all contribute to innovation. Figure
5 on the next page illustrates the
interaction. Before a technology
is deployed, some basic RD&D
brings down the cost to a level at
which some deployment can be
started. Deployment leads to
learning – so the more a new
technology is deployed, the lower
the cost becomes. Learning can
be speeded up by continuous
funding of RD&D. At some point
the technology will be able to
compete with other technologies
on the market. This point will be
reached earlier (and hence
encourage private investors to do
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
Pa
te
nt
s/
ye
ar
Pa
te
nt
s/
ye
ar
Solar patents
30
33
36
39
50
100
150
200
250
Wind patents
Figure 3: Estimated impact on the number of corresponding patents of an increase in German public
RD&D for solar panels and wind turbines
Source: Zachmann et al (2014). Note: in both panels, black line: number of patents expected with no policy change; red line: number of
patents expected with one standard-deviation higher RD&D spending after 2002.
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MAKING LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT SMARTER
and combination of these three
major instruments to most effec-
tively and efficiently bring down
their cost.
In Zachmann et al (2014) we find
that both deployment and public
RD&D support matter in terms of
innovation. Our results indicate
that there is a benefit in combin-
ing deployment and RD&D. The
patenting of wind turbine technol-
ogy in particular is strongest in
countries that combine strong
RD&D support and deployment.
Figure 6 illustrates our estimates
derived for OECD countries using
the example of Germany. The
impact of only RD&D plus the
impact of only deployment is
smaller than the impact of a com-
bination of the two. In fact,
support for deployment some
years after substantial invest-
ments in R&D coincided with the
strongest development of corre-
sponding patents. That would be
in line with the hypothesis that it
is not massive actual deploy-
ment, but the prospect of
deployment, that is the carrot for
industry to commercialise the
technologies developed through
publicly-supported R&D.
Europe's recent focus has been
on deployment. Public spending
on deployment of wind and solar
technology has, for example,
been vastly greater (about €48
billion in the five largest EU coun-
tries in 2010) than spending on
RD&D support (about €315 mil-
lion). This raises the question of
whether this bias is the most effi-
cient way to stimulate innovation.
FOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SMARTER TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT 
Better carbon pricing
The EU ETS could in principle pro-
vide a valuable signal for
low-carbon investment. In its cur-
rent design, about 54 billion
more RD&D and deployment on
their own) if there is a predictable
carbon price.
For any given technology, one
might ask what is the right timing
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Figure 6: Wind turbines in Germany: estimated additional increase
in patents from combining deployment and RD&D
Source: Zachmann et al (2014).
allowances (each worth one ton
of CO2) will be issued between
2015 and 206711. Given the allo-
cation schedule over time and the
expected annual emissions,
allowances are likely to become
scarce in the late 2020s. From
then on the market will rapidly
tighten. This future scarcity of
allowances should translate into
a high price. Market participants
should anticipate the rising price
and buy unused allowances
today and set them aside – thus
raising current prices. Conse-
quently, the ETS would bring
about a valid and forward-looking
carbon price signal. However, the
allowance price today does not
reflect future scarcity (expected
prices in 2030 are about €40
while prices today are below
€10). Given that traders could
buy allowances today and sell
them in 2030, the low current
prices indicate a lack of confi-
dence in the instrument, which
can be explained by volatile poli-
cies driving the supply and
demand of allowances. Accepting
1.4 billion international carbon
credits into the system12 and con-
stantly discussing the allocation
mechanism showed market par-
ticipants that the cap of 54 billion
allowances is not set in stone.
And national decarbonisation
policies in sectors covered by the
ETS – such as the UK carbon floor
price or the discussion about a
forced German coal-phase-out –
undermine the efficiency of the
instrument. Lower demand for
allowances in member states that
conduct additional decarbonisa-
tion in sectors with high
abatement costs will free up
allowances in those countries.
Other sectors and member states
will be able to use those
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11. Pending the adop-
tion of new ETS rules for
the post-2020 period.
For the third phase of
the ETS (2013-20), the
annual number of emis-
sion allowances issued
decreases by 38 mil-
lion each year –
starting from a value of
2084 million in 2013 –
hence reaching, in prin-
ciple, a negative value
in 2068 if the reduction
is continued at this
rate.
12. In the second
phase of the ETS
(2008-12), it was pos-
sible to exchange a
certain volume of inter-
national carbon credits
for European credits. As
the price of interna-
tional credits was very
low because of the
absence of carbon trad-
ing outside Europe, all
the permitted volumes
were exchanged for EU
allowances.
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allowances to emit more. In total
this makes carbon reduction
more expensive, because
cheaply avoidable emissions
might not be avoided in member
states that only rely on the ETS.
Eventually, the latter will also
introduce additional measures to
avoid these emissions – render-
ing the ETS completely
redundant. As the ETS is a long-
term decarbonisation device, the
challenge is to isolate it against
short-sighted intervention, while
still allowing the system to
respond to structural shifts.
To establish the necessary confi-
dence in the ETS, policymakers
need to credibly commit to the
system. One promising mecha-
nism would be to sell guarantees
of the future carbon price. This
could be organised in the form of
a private contract between those
making low-carbon investments
and the public sector. A public
bank (eg the European Invest-
ment Bank) would offer contracts
that agree to pay in the future any
positive difference between the
actual carbon price and a target
level. Investors would bid to
acquire such contracts to hedge
their investments. Hence, public
budgets would be significantly
exposed to the functioning of the
ETS. If future climate policymak-
ers take decisions that lead to
increases in the number of avail-
able carbon allowances, they
might be called back by the treas-
uries, because this would activate
the guarantees pledged to
investors. Consequently, all par-
ties – also investors not covered
by the scheme – would know that
there is money on the table. This
would serve as a much stronger
and hence more credible commit-
ment device for preserving the
integrity of the ETS. The lower risk
associated with the future carbon
price would immediately imply a
higher carbon price. The scheme
would introduce a soft form of a
floor price by making it expensive
but not illegal for policymakers to
accept very low carbon prices in
the future.
More Europe
Although the EU has a joint car-
bon-pricing mechanism,
deployment and RD&D support in
member states are only weakly
coordinated. For deployment in
particular this is regrettable
because a more European
approach could achieve the same
deployment at significantly lower
cost. For example, much more
electricity could be generated
from the same capacity of
deployed solar panels if they
were installed in the sunniest
locations, rather than in the mem-
ber states that provide the
highest subsidies. A European
approach also tends to be more
stable than national policies, and
stability is crucial for encouraging
private investments in complex
new value chains and energy sys-
tems. A European approach would
also enable more competition
because of its larger market size
and could ease the integration of
new technologies into existing
systems. Ultimately, a European
approach to deployment of low-
carbon technologies could be
more easily integrated into the
internal energy market, while the
prevalent national schemes are
partly responsible for the cur-
rently-observed costly renational-
isation of the energy sector.
A more European framework for
support to green innovation
makes sense because the posi-
tive effects of supporting
innovation tend to spillover to
neighbouring countries. Zach-
mann et al (2014) finds, for
example, that deployment
appears to have substantial
cross-border effects on innova-
tion – increased deployment in
one country coincides with
increased patenting in nearby
countries. Consequently, a
national evaluation of the costs
and benefits might underesti-
mate the benefits of deployment
– hence a more European
approach would be more suitable.
In terms of technology choice
more European coordination is
also worthwhile. Individual mem-
ber states cannot meaningfully
support a sufficiently large portfo-
lio of technologies necessary to
ensure resilient decarbonisation.
For transport decarbonisation, for
example, there is still no certainty
whether the future will be fuel-cell
hydrogen, battery electric, modal
shift, biofuels or something else.
So European coordination should
ensure that we do not put ‘all eggs
in one basket’ by only going big
on one single technology, but
coordination should also ensure
that fragmentation cannot pre-
vent efficient support to the most
promising technologies.
Support deployment and RD&D
Support for renewables in Europe
has been focused on deploy-
ment, while support for other
technologies (eg hydrogen) has
been focused on RD&D. There is
no clear innovation-economic
rationale for this dichotomy,
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13. Primary energy con-
sumption of oil, natural
gas and coal amounts to
about 6 percent of global
GDP. Adding the value of
existing non-fossil elec-
tricity production (about
$2 trillion) and all the
energy downstream cost
and the demand side
appliances (from cars to
heat pumps to refrigera-
tors) it is likely that a
global market for new
energy technologies
would amount to more
than 10 percent of world
GDP.
14. The role-out of elec-
tric heating in France
and Germany can partly
be explained as a
response to the avail-
ability of unused
electricity at night-time.
MAKING LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT SMARTER
which appears to have arisen for
political-economy reasons. As a
consequence, policymakers
should reconsider this balance
by, for example, shifting support
from deployment to RD&D fund-
ing for renewables. The focus of
renewables support should be
shifted from a ‘deployment target’
that encourages the quick build-
up of the cheapest
currently-available renewable
energy technology, to an ambi-
tious ‘innovation target’ that
encourages investment in reduc-
ing the cost of renewable energy
technologies. In addition, deploy-
ment programmes should be
coordinated with RD&D pro-
grammes. It should be ensured
that technology-specific deploy-
ment is organised in a way that
stimulates competition between
providers, especially through the
development of programmes with
a volume and time horizon that
will enable the build-up of innova-
tive value chains. If successful,
an ‘innovation target’ will be the
greatest possible contribution of
Europe (and its partners) to sav-
ing the global climate, and it might
be instrumental in developing a
competitive edge in what will
eventually become an important
global market13.
Technology support mechanism
Political decisions about which
technology to support, and when
and how to do so can have very
far-reaching consequences. With-
out public support for the nuclear
industry in the 1960s and 1970s,
for example, the fuel mix, electric-
ity networks and even electricity
consumption patterns14 would
look markedly different today.
Policymakers cannot and will not
abstain from technology choices.
The challenge is therefore to
enable them to make good
choices.
One proposal in Zachmann et al
(2012, p96ff) is to set up a trans-
parent evaluation process of
‘support schemes for individual
technologies’. A level playing field
for public support for new tech-
nologies requires that
governments’ choices of a tech-
nology portfolio should not be
driven by the question of ‘which’
but by the question of ‘how’. Gov-
ernments should adopt choice
mechanisms that are dynamic
and adaptable, able to digest new
information and optimise support
in a quick, reliable and effective
manner. Transparency is critical
for the success of any choice
mechanism, so that industry and
consumers can form the right
expectations about the direction
of technology. The only way to
control the potential impact of
public policy on industry invest-
ment choices is through a
transparent policy that clearly
communicates government prior-
ities and decision-making
parameters. Transparency also
promotes fair competition and
inspires trust on the part of indus-
try and consumers. Stakeholder
trust is fundamental to the suc-
cess of energy transition policy.
Finally, it is important to note that
the mechanism should be utilised
to select not only one, but a port-
folio of technologies.
The first step in constructing a
technology-choice mechanism is
to define a transparent set of met-
rics and priorities (which can later
be updated, as the demands of
society and climate action
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MAKING LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT SMARTER
change). The interest of govern-
ments is to support the optimal
portfolio of technologies in terms
of certain metrics – such as cost,
timeline, efficiency, benefits and
safety. These metrics and priori-
ties should be as
technology-neutral as possible,
and should be the driving force
behind the technology-choice
mechanism.
All stakeholders involved in the
selection of new technologies
face the problem of imperfect
information. However, the devel-
opers of different technologies
might have an interest in over-
stating the capabilities, or
understating the cost, of their
respective technologies in order
to attract more support (or even
lock out competitors). Therefore,
the public technology-choice
mechanism must be one that iter-
atively elicits unbiased estimates
from industry.
At the very least, such mecha-
nisms could provide a better
avenue for choice-mechanism
definition than a simple ‘shot-in-
the-dark’ definition of thresholds
or numbers. A European mecha-
nism for allocating support to
technologies can create a level
playing field for competing tech-
nologies. It would promote more
coordination between regions,
nations and companies. The cost
of the transition is put at several
percentage points of GDP. There-
fore, large-scale government
intervention will be unavoidable.
Consequently, a structured
approach adapted to the com-
plexity of the challenge is
warranted to avoid extensive inef-
ficiencies. This approach should
not be applied mechanically to
determine technology-support
policies, but as a reference tool to
inform policy decisions and struc-
ture the political debate. 
15. So a consortia might
for example, either pro-
pose a low-benefit,
risk-free project and
accept a high ex-post
penalty for failure (if
they fail they give all
money back), or a high-
risk project with a
potentially spectacular
breakthrough for which
only a small penalty (eg
10 percent of the public
money) would be fore-
seen in case of failure.
16.
https://setis.ec.europa.eu/.
One example of a mechanism for
achieving this would be for tech-
nology developers to offer a
‘menu’ of different support
options for the development/
deployment of their new tech-
nologies. This would contain
promises about the metrics
defined in the first step of the
mechanism’s design, and the
expected form and volume of sup-
port. Attached to each option
would be a requirement to meet
certain quality metrics by a cer-
tain date, penalties for failing to
do so and a reward for success15.
An open and transparent energy
and transport transition model
would be used to evaluate the
menus. The model would suggest
a combination of support options
to develop a sufficiently resilient
portfolio of technologies at lowest
cost. The model should be run and
maintained by a central authority
such as the Strategic Energy
Technology Information System16.
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